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In a manner not unlike the other industries highlighted in this series of reports, aerospace,
the “crown jewel” of post-war U.S. manufacturing, is experiencing a structural decline, seeing
“good jobs” slipping away at an alarming rate. The 1990s have seen the U.S. aerospace industry
undergoing a far-reaching process of consolidation; shedding thousands of highly-skilled, well-
paid blue collar jobs in addition to white collar design and engineering jobs that only a few years
ago seemed secure. In five short years, between 1989 and 1994, aerospace equipment
manufacturers cut close to half a million jobs, a decline of 37% fi-om their 1989 employment level
of 1,33 1,000. parber and Scott, p. 121 Much of this decline has to do with the slowing of
military orders as the Cold War wkes. But declining employment in aerospace manufacture has
occurred alongside a narrowing of the trade surplus, an increase in the foreign content of
commercial aircraft and engines, and a greater role for foreign companies in product development
and even basic research activities. These developments are all indications of a structural shift in
the industry, one whereby production has become increasingly globalized over the last two
decades.
These developments have been particularly significant in the area of aircraft engine
manufacturing which saw employment peaking in 1988 with 141,400 U.S. employees. El992
Census of Manufactures, p.37B-91  By 1995, employment in the industry had plummeted by
almost half to 76,300. Cl995 Annual Survey of Manufactures, p. l-241 The U.S. barely maintains a
trade surplus in aircraft engines and engine parts, with exports of $6.266 billion and imports of
$5.247 billion in 1993, despite the fact that the two largest firms in the industry, General Electric
Aircraft Engines and Pratt and Whitney, which together command two-thirds of the world
market, are U.S.-based. [Aerospace Industries Association (a), p. 122- 1231 Probably the most
telling indication of a structural shift in the industry is the fact that, since 1993, new orders have
been on the increase (up 25% in 1994 and 10% in 1995, in real terms). [See Appendix 21 But
during this period, the decline in employment continued unabated, with 27,000 jobs lost between
1993 and 1995 alone. [See Appendix 21
How the U.S. aircraft engine industry went from being the world’s leader in the design,
development, and manufacture of the most sophisticated equipment in transportation to its
1current, diminished state is a story that involves many factors, but whose central character is
uncertainty. Simply stated, building aircraft engines is risky business; development costs for a new
engine program can run to $1.5 billion (for firms whose revenues are in the $6 billion range) and
product cycles span not years, but decades. The fact that General Electric and Pratt and Whitney
remain world leaders in sales proves that these firms have responded to this uncertainty well
enough to not merely survive, but to lead the market. However, over the last two decades, what
has also become clear is that these firms’ investment and marketing strategies, however adept at
managing risk for shareholders, have not had the effect of preserving the stock of good jobs in the
U.S. A key reason for this is the reluctance of U.S. firms to make the kinds of investments
necessary to extend learning to fion;-line production workers on the shop floor. While the
existing literature on the industry has not focused on organizational integration as an important
determinant of enterprise and national competitive advantage, it is clear that many aspects of the
U.S.‘s slipping competitive advantage in the industry cannot be explained without a consideration
of organizational integration.
Industry overview
The aircraft engine and aircraft engine parts industry is made up of firms engaged in the
design, development and manufacture of engines for various types of aircraft. Aircraft engines
can be of two types, turbine or piston engines. The latter make up a negligible fraction of engines
produced, measured by value.’ For the purposes of this report, we will focus on large turbofan
engines produced for large civil transports or military aircraft.’ According to the 1995 Annual
Survey of Manufactures, the U.S. aircraft engines and engine parts industry, (classified by the
’ In 1993, aircraft powered by piston engines represented shipments of only $76 million, or less than
0.2% of total aircraft shipments. [Aerospace Industries Association,(a), pp 32, 39,40.]
2 Other markets for turbine engines are general aviation (e.g. business jets) and helicopters. Together
these segments accounted for only about 10% of aircraft shipments in 1993 with general aviation shipments
of $2.1 billion and civil helicopter shipments of $113 million. By comparison, shipments of large civil
transports totaled $24.1 billion that same year. On the military side, the 1993 flyaway value of military
helicopter acceptances amounted to $1.5 billion compared to $9.8 billion for all other aircraft (e.g. bombers,
fighters, transports). [Aerospace Industries Association, (a), pp 32,401
2Department of Commerce’s Standard Industrial Classification system as SIC 3724) recorded
shipments of $17.5 billion. The industry employed 76,300 people in 1995, with a total payroll of
$3.6 billion. Aircraft engine and engine parts employment represented about one sixth of the 1995
total aerospace industry employment of 483,200. [ 1995 Annual Survey of Manufactures, p. l-241
Table 1.1995 S1atistics for Aerospace Equipment Industry
‘995 Census of Manufactures. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
Value added
Produc- by Value of
Employ- tion manufacture shipments
IT’JDUSTRY (SIC) I ees 1 Workers  1 (million S) (million S)
I I I
Aircraft (3721) 201,400 86,400 20,904.3 49,504.l
Engines and Engine Parts (3724) 76,300 41,900 9.061.3 17.519.4
A&raft Parts & Equipment (3728) I 116,300 I 64,000  1 11,903s I 16,841.3
Guided Missiles 8z Space Vehicles (376 1) @,800 20,000 7,770.2 14,315.2
Space Propulsion Units & Parts (3764) 19,600 6,700 1,943.5 2,953.6
Space Vehicle Equipment, N.E.C. (3769) 1 8,800 I 4,600 I 852.0 1 1,397.g
Aerospace Totals 483,200 223,600 52434.8 102,531.S
While the number of firms in the industry is quite large, the bulk of industry employment is
concentrated in large establishments. Of the 442 establishments recorded by the most recent
Census of Manufactures, 301, or 68% of these establishments were small, employing fewer than
100 employees. Although large in number, these establishments accounted for only 7% of
industry employment. [ 1992 Census of Manufactures, p. 37B- 161 Most of these establishments
represent smaller parts and components manufacturers. These many small firms supply the three,
large, integrated firms that design, manufacture and sell complete jet engines for large commercial
and military aircraft; Pratt & Whitney, owned by United Technologies (IJTC), General Electric
Aircraft Engines, both U.S.-based, and the British Rolls Royce plc (hereafter to be referred to as
Pratt, GE and Rolls, respectively).
General Electric currently leads the market in new commercial orders, winning half of
1995 world orders for large engines. GE’s 1995 revenues amounted to $6.098 billion. Pratt’s
31995 revenues were even greater than those of GE, however, amounting to $6.170 billion.
This outcome would seem impossible in most industries. How could it be that despite
more new commercial orders, GE’s revenues could be lower than PratCs? This peculiar
comparison points to the significance of follow-on sales, especially sales of spare parts, in the
engine business. In an industry where the product may last 20 to 30 years, time plays a significant
role. Although GE may be gaining a greater share of new commercial orders, Pratt’s historic
dominance of the market through the mid 1980’s means that it is still earning revenues as a result
of orders that were filled as long ago as the early 1970’s. In fact, in 1993, 45% of all engines
installed on civil aircraft worldwide were Pratt and Whitney engines.3  [Aerospace Industries
Association (a), p.881 The unusually long product cycle in the engine business (and indeed in the
aircraft industry at large) contributes significantly to the character of the competitive landscape of
the industry, a point to which we will return.
The competitive landscape in engine manufacture
Pratt, GE and Rolls compete vigorously for initial orders; their customers being either
airframe manufacturers (for example, Boeing or Airbus), commercial airlines or governments and
their armed forces. Demand for engines is highly cyclical, depending on the financial health of
commercial airlines as well as on government expenditures, especially on defense. Manufacturers
attempt to compete across a range of products, offering a “family” of engines that span from
16,000 lbs of thrust to more than 80,000 lbs. to fit aircraft carrying from as few as 100 to as many
as 500 passengers. ’
To the winners of intense sales competitions go the spoils of not only initial orders, but
also future spare parts and possibly follow-on service and maintenance revenue. In the past, the
gains Corn initial orders were particularly great, due to the prevalence of “single source”
contracts. “Single sourcing” refers to the historical practice of new aircraft programs selecting
only one engine for a given airplane. In other words, when an airline ordered a plane, the engines
3 See Appendix 3 for world civil market share data for the major engine manufacturers.
’ See Appendix 1 for product specifications for major large commercial aircraft and engines.
4were “part of the package”. Usually, the airframe manufacturer, along with an airline which
committed to purchasing the aircraft early on in the development process, known as a “launch
customer” decided which engine would power an aircraft. For example, all McDonnell-Douglas
MD-80 and Boeing 727 aircraft are powered exclusively by Pratt’s JT8-D engine, all MD-90
aircraft are powered by the V2500 engine, and all Airbus A34O’s are powered by the CFM-56.
Single sourcing provided “pricing power” to engine manufacturers, generating stability in
revenues, allowing for development costs to be spread over a large base. [Smart, Browder and
Dawley, p. 1261 Now, however, single sourcing is the exception rather than the rule. For the
majority of new aircraft, airlines have a choice of engines when they make’a purchase. This
means that engine manufacturers now engage in intense competition, not just at the time of the
launch of a new aircraft program, but continually, each time an airline buys a plane.
Since engines typically represent 25% of an airplane’s price, a significant share, airlines,
under intense price competition themselves, clearly prefer having a choice of engines, as
manufacturers offer discounts and attractive financing arrangements to win orders [Feldman,
p.561. These discounts can be significant. For example, 1995 and 1996 saw all three engine
makers selling engines for Boeing’s new 777 at discounts of up to  75%, charging prices that
covered only half the cost of development and production. [Smart, Browder and Dawley, p. 1241
“Discounts” of this magnitude would suggest an impending hemorrhaging of profits, yet all three
engine manufacturers have enjoyed increasing profits since 1994.
This seemingly paradoxical accounting can be explained by the importance of spare parts
and follow-on sales in the industry. Spare parts and maintenance may amount to two to three
times the original cost of the engine over an engine’s lifetime, creating a significant revenue
stream for the manufacturer, long after the initial sale. [March, p.271 According to one trade
publication, current pricing strategy in the engines market amounts to “win a sale no matter what
and make it up in captive spares volume.” [Vincent, p.551 According to Air Transport World,
Pratt currently “counts on customers’ buying 1 ‘/2 to 2 times the initial purchase value of whole
engines in spares.” [Vincent, p.561 Clearly, spare parts sales represent a significant source of
revenue; for UTC, parent company of P&W, for example, sales of spares represent 40% of total
corporate pretax earnings. For GE, parts and service generate a third of revenues. [Carley, p.AS]
5However, analysts worry
down the road for firms.
that this over-reliance on future spares revenue may pose problems
In the past, sales of spares were the way to finance new development
projects. With firms relying on spares revenue to recoup losses incurred at the time of the initial
sale, resources for new product development will be sparse.
Current pricing practices will likely increase the reliance of GE, Pratt and Rolls on other
firms to share the financing of bringing new products to market, accelerating the trend of
international collaboration in engine development. Moreover, it is conceivable that this dynamic
could become self-reinforcing, evolving into a downward spiral for U.S. producers. That is, as
greater shares of production are taken on by international partners, it can be expected that more
of the high-margin spares business will be undertaken by international partners as well, meaning
even fewer resources flowing to U.S. producers for future product development, creating an even
greater need to collaborate with international partners in development with each successive
generation of products. It may be the case that this dynamic has already been set in motion. The
past two decades have seen the degree of reliance on intemational.partners  growing among GE,
Pratt and Rolls in almost all phases of the business, from production to financing new product
development, even product development itself According to most industry analysts, a key
element driving this reliance is risk. Trade magazine Air Transport World summed up the current
position of engine manufacturers recently this way, “[According to former GE Aircraft Engines
CEO, Brian Rowe], ‘If we spend $1 billion over four years [to develop an engine], we’ll probably
break even in 17 years’ on a product whose life may be 20 years. That’s a long time when GE
Chairman Jack Welch is your boss.” [Vincent, p.563 According to this line of reasoning, the
financial pressures manufacturers are under to produce rates of return acceptable to Wall Street
dictate that they find some way to spread development costs and risks; their chosen path has been
to look overseas. However, whether “risk-sharing” is the only, or even the most significant factor
driving these international partnerships may be an open question.
Recent industry trends
Due to the aforementioned costs associated with developing new engines and the
reluctance of the “big three” to bear the uncertainty inherent in the industry individually, GE, Pratt
6and Rolls have increasingly relied on collaboration with other firms to share development costs
and risks. Through collaboration, these firms “compete across ranges by offering engines
produced in partnership in those areas where they are relatively weak.” [Todd, p. 1321
Collaboration is generally international in nature, pairing firms across both Atlantic and
Pacific in partnerships taking a number of forms. There are risk-sharing agreements where
“junior” partners commit to financing some share of the project in exchange for a defined work
share as a subcontractor sometimes, though not always, participating in the development process.
At a more involved level, there are joint ventures where partners form entirely new corporations
with each partner holding an equity stake in the enterprise, sharing activities from development to
manufacture to marketing and after-sales service.
The most enduring of these partnerships involves GE and the French firm SNECMA
(Societe Nationale d’Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d’Aviation). GE - SNECMA
cooperation dates back to 1969 when SNECMA played a key subcontracting role in producing
GE’s CF6 engines for the first generation of Airbus, the A300. [Hayward, p. 1281 In its current
form, this partnership takes the form of a joint venture called CFM International in which each
partner holds a 50% share. CFM International manufactures the highly successful CFM-56 for
mid-size jets such as the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 and the wide body A340. The success of
CFM International is reflected in the fact that its engines account for 10.9% of installed engines
on civil transports; impressive market share when compared with Rolls’ 9.1% share and even
GE’s 11.0% share. [Aerospace Industries Association (a), p.881 GE has continued and expanded
its partnership with SNECMA most recently in developing the GE90, the giant 80,000 lb. thrust
engine built to power Boeing’s new 777 super twinjet which entered service in 1995. Facing a
$1.5 billion price tag to develop the GE90, GE and SNECMA invited the Japanese firm
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries @II) and the Italian firm Fiat Aviazione Societa per
Azioni to collaborate in development. [Smart and Schiller, p.801
Meanwhile Pratt is involved in a number of collaborative partnerships as well as
maintaining membership in a joint venture called International Aero Engines (IAE) which
manufactures the 25,000 to 30,000 lb. thrust V2500 engine and its derivatives which power
narrow bodies like Airbus models A3 19, A320 and A321 as well as McDonnell Douglas’ MD90.
7Firms that make up IAE include Pratt, Rolls, Fiat, Daimler Benz subsidiary Motoren-und-
Turbinen-Union Munchen  (MTU) and a consortium known as Japanese Aero Engine Corporation
(JAEC). JAEC is, in turn, made up of Japanese “Heavies”, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI),
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI). While IAE
is made up of many firms, its structure is basically an “alliance of two multifirm groups, centered
respectively around Rolls Royce (partners with JAEC) and Pratt and Whitney (partners with
MTU and Fiat).” [Mowery;  p.881
There is, to an extent, a sort of cross-firm, cross-national “division of labor” on these
cooperative projects. The lead fiti on a project (Pratt, GE or Rolls) designs and manufactures
the “heart” of the engine, the high-pressure turbine and compressor. Fiat has come to specialize
in gear boxes, while IHI has an expertise in long shafts which connect the low-pressure turbine
and fan. wational Research Council, pp. 13 l-1381 MTU, MJXI and IHI tend to manufacture disks
and blades for low-pressure turbines and low-pressure compressors. mational Research Council,
pp. 13 l-1391
Table 2. International Partnerships in Commercial Engine Development and Manufacture
I I
Partnership Engine Aircraft Application
Intexnational Am Engines (IAE) v2500 Airbus A319, A320, and A321 as well
Pratt & Whitney (33%). Rolls Royce (25%). Fiat (8%). as McDonnell Douglas MD90
MTU (11%). W (13.8%),  KHI (5.8%), MHI (3.5%)
Pratt& Whitney, MI-II (lO%),  KHI (1%) PW4000 Airbus A300 and A31 0, McDonnell
Douglas MD1 I, and Boeing 747 and
767
Pratt & Whitney, M-i-U (12.5%), MI-II (5%). KHI (1%) PW4084 Boeing 777
Pratt 62 Whitney, h4TU (12%),  MHI (2.8%)
I
PW JT8D- McDonnell Douglas MD80
200
CFM InternatiOnal
GE (50%) and SNECMA (50%)
CFM56 powers [he Airbus A319. A320, A321
and A340 as well as Boeing 737
GE (59%), SNECMA (25%). W (9%). Fiat (7%) GE-90 powers the Boeing 777
With the exception of the GE-SNECMA partnership, collaborative arrangements are
generally project-specific, with firms that are fierce competitors in one product line cooperating in
the development of other products. For example, Pratt’s PW2037  is a direct competitor to Rolls’
8RB21 l-535 for the Boeing 757 (thrust range of 38,000 lbs.), yet through IAE these two firms
collaborated in the development of the V2500 engine for the Air-bus A320 (thrust range of 25,000
lbs.). Further illustrating the project-specific nature of cooperation was Fiat and Ml’s recent
collaboration with GE and SNECMA on development of the GE90 for the new Boeing 777,  an
engine which competes with the 84,000 lb.-thrust PW4084 built by Pratt, MHI and KHI.
Although Fiat and IHI partner with Pratt, MHI and KHI through ME, membership in IAE does
not preclude cooperation with GE on other projects for these firms. Nor does Rolls’ membership
in IAE prevent it from launching its own engine for the 777, the  RB211 Trent, independently.
As discussed above, participation in collaborative projects for the “big three”, GE, Pratt
and Rolls, is a way to offer a complete “family” of engines in the face of exceedingly high costs of
development. For the smaller manufacturers, decisions to participate in risk-sharing partnerships
or co-development may be made strictly on the prospects for sales, but usually involve a
consideration of opportunities for learning. As will be discussed in more detail below, while
partnering for the “big three” generally has to do with accessing markets, sharing financial risks
and lowering costs, for the smaller manufacturers, partnering is a way to break into what might
otherwise remain a global oligopoly, sacrificing short-term losses for access to specialized product
and process technologies which, in the long term, creates significant opportunities for
organizational learning both within the aerospace industry and across other sectors. Japanese
firms are a case in point. For KHI, MHI and IHI, all members of JAEC, participating in a number
of collaborations across a range of products has become a conscious strategy, with the result that
“no new airframe in the twentieth century will be equipped with an engine that is not
manufactured at least in part in Japan.” [Samuels, p.2571 The emergence of Japanese and
European firms as key players in an industry that as recently as 25 years ago was dominated by
U.S. manufacturers speaks to the determination of these firms, but also to the determination of the
governments of their respective countries who played important roles in steering resources to
aerospace, mitigating potentially destructive competitive tendencies and fostering a stable,
domestic market, helping to nuture aerospace growth. Interestingly, these were exactly the same
roles that the U.S. government played in fostering aerospace competitive advantage in the post-
war era.
9History of the industry in the U.S.
‘The aerospace industry was the “crown jewel” of American industry in the Post-War era.
Employing more workers than any other manufacturing industry save autos, U.S. aerospace
enjoyed a technological advantage that no other nation was able to match. This advantage was
fostered by decades of Cold War military expenditures and reinforced by a stable, regulated
commercial market. Hefty defense contracts from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) as
well as from foreign allies helped to finance research and development  acti.vities, which in many
cases were carried over to commercial applications. For example, GE got its start in engine
manufacture when it was selected by the U.S. military in September 1941 to manufacture the
British “Whittle engine”. Though GE had been involved in gas turbine research dating back to
1903, under the direction of engineers Sanford Moss in Lynn, Massachusetts and Glenn Warren in
Schenectady, New York, GE “teetered on the edge of the turbojet revolution throughout the
1930s” while engineers in Europe forged ahead designing the first jet engines. [Constant, p.2211
While this early research was crucial in positioning GE for undertaking war-time projects, it
wasn’t until the 1960s that GE broke into the commercial market. Again, though, military
contracts served as the foundation for GE’s success when GE successfully transferred the
concepts imbedded in the TF-39 high bypass turbofan engine to a commercial turbofan, the CF-6.
The TF-39 was developed for the Air Force’s giant C-S transport and the Department of Defense
picked up $495 million in development costs for the project. Likewise, CFM International’s
successful CFM56 engine is designed around the core of the F101, also developed for the Air
Force by GE. [March, p.761
At the same time that the U.S. Department of Defense and NASA were supporting
research and development activities, regulation of commercial airlines under the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) also had the effect of fostering technology improvements in aircraft and engine
design and manufacture. CAB regulation of routes and fares meant that airlines were, for the
most part, not competing on the basis of price, but rather on the basis of service. This had the
effect of creating a “technology pull” from airlines and allowed airframe and engine manufacturers
to pass on costs of development to airlines, who could then, pass increased costs along to
10consumers in the form of CAB-approved fare increases*. The stable margins created for
manufacturers as a result of direct and indirect government support played a crucial role in
financing development activities in this risk-laden industry where the product may last for 25 years
or more and where the costs of developing a new product run into the billions of dollars. The
technological and market advantages of U.S. manufacturers combined to place the U.S. at the
pinnacle of aerospace: in 197 1 2,076 of the 2,136 jet aircraft in service on U.S. airlines were
produced by American manufacturers. [Thornton, p.291 This landscape began to shift, however,
during the mid-1970s.
The shifting landscape of engine manufacture
Just as the end of the Korean War had slowed orders, the 1970’s brought a Post-Vietnam
military downsizing. Real federal expenditures on aerospace declined by half from 1968 to 1974
causing employment among engine manufacturers to plummet from its historic peak of 195,400
employees in 1967 to only 99,300 by 1976 [Aerospace Industries Association,  1994/95 p.21, 24
and 1977 Census of Manufactures, p.37B-51. Alongside this decline in employment began a trend
of geographic dispersion. Traditionally, the engine and engine parts industry in the U.S. had been
concentrated in Southern New England (Massachusetts and Connecticut) and in the Midwest
(Ohio), being centered around Pratt and Whitney’s headquarters in Hartford, Connecticut and
around GE Aircraft Engines alternating headquarters in Lynn, Massachusetts and Evendale, Ohio.
Starting in the late 1950’s, however, GE began moving toward parallel production, the practice of
building multiple production facilities capable of handling the same work, with its establishment of
a plant in Ludlow, Vermont. Later, in the mid-1970s GE established another Vermont plant in
Rutland  also adding plants in Madisonville, Kentucky, Durham and Wilmington, North Carolina,
and Albuquerque, New Mexico. Pratt and Whitney, meanwhile pursued a similar course,
establishing plants in Canada, West Virginia, and North Berwick, Maine. This strategy of parallel
production was a way for GE and Pratt to ensure that work-stoppages due to strikes or other
labor actions would not jeopardize on-time delivery of products. Disputes such as the 1965 IUE
5 For more on the role of Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulation in fostering “technology-push”
in commercial aircraft and engine manufacture, see March ( 1989).strike in Lynn documented in David Noble’s Forces of Production were indicative of the rocky
nature of labor-management relations in the industry. GE was also the target of a major
company-wide strike in 1969, when the 13 unions representing GE workers at 233 plants in 33
states walked out. [Bluestone et al., p. 1531 The strike was a long one, lasting 101 days. For its
part, Pratt also felt the effects of a strong, unionized workforce  when a 1979 strike at two
important suppliers delayed delivery of FlOO engines. Thus, parallel production also served as a
means to reassert workplace control. In their major study of the engine industry, Bluestone et al.
contend that parallel production served the dual purposes of “provid[ingJ  production capacity
during company/union labor disputes, and severely weaken[ing] the union’s ability to strike in the
first place.” pluestone et al., pp 82-831
While U.S. firms were pursuing a downsizing of the industry and utilizing adaptive
strategies such as parallel production to drive down costs, during this same period, the major
European countries and Japan had recognized the strategic importance of aerospace, not merely
in the traditional military sense, but also to industry overall in generating high-end product and
process technologies. The good jobs associated with a world-class aerospace industry were an
additional incentive in devoting resources to aerospace activities. The Allies wanted their share of
the highly skilled, well-paid, and relatively secure employment that U.S. aerospace workers
enjoyed, partly as a result of military and commercial sales outside of the U.S. In Europe, this
pursuit of a domestic aerospace industry took the form of the successtil Airbus Industrie
consortium which had its beginnings in the early 196Os, joining firms from across Europe. The
first Airbus, the commercial wide-body, twin-aisle A300, entered service in 1974, powered by the
fuel-efficient high-bypass turbofan CF-6 (designed and developed by GE, but assembled by the
French SNECMA). High fuel prices added to the design advantages of the A300 and, after a
slow start, sparked demand for the Airbus, marking the first major European inroad into
commercial aerospace. Meanwhile in Japan, MIT1 had been playing a significant role in targeting
resources to develop a Japanese aerospace industry and aiding the process of technology diffusion
across firms in the industry. Throughout the 197Os, Europe and Japan continued to nurture their
respective aerospace industries and used NATO military procurements to leverage opportunities
for access to U.S. aerospace technologies and to produce U.S. aircraft and engines under license.
12Perhaps the most dramatic shift in the competitive landscape came in 1978 with the end of
airline regulation in the U.S., marking an end to CAB-approved fares and the end of an era of
equipment cost “pass-through”. Airlines now competed firmly on the basis of price and in the
new environment of post-deregulation competition, airlines pushed aifiamers for competition in
making purchases. Whereas in the past the purchase of a particular aircraft meant the purchase of
one designated engine, airlines pushed manufacturers for choice of engines. While the
disappearance of “single sourcing” was not a result of deregulation, per se (it in fact had begun to
fade with the advent of the turbo-fan in the mid-1960’s), “single sourcing” became even more of a
rarity after deregulation and contributed even more to a climate of increased uncertainty for
manufacturers. In response, U.S. firms, unwilling to make investments in organizational
integration independently, began looking more and more to international partners to collaborate in
production and to share the financial risks of development. European and Japanese producers,
eager for learning opportunities, were happy to oblige.
Roots of international capacity in engine manufacture
Certainly, the ability of international partners to collaborate with U.S. engine
manufacturers was a necessary pre-condition to any globalization of production in the industry.
Had European and Japanese firms been lacking in skills and/or physical capacity, U.S. firms would
have had to come up with some other way of dealing with the uncertainty inherent in engine
production. Clearly, this was not the case, however; in Europe and in Japan development of a
internationally competitive domestic aerospace industry was a goal pursued for many decades.
The manner in which this goal was targeted and the degree to which it was achieved varies, of
course, according to the country in question. Two examples of successful targeting of aero-
engine manufacture can be found in France and Japan, examples to which we now turn.
France
The development of France as a player in the world turbo-engine market had its
beginnings in military activities, activities that were closely tied with the U.S. armed services.
Samuels credits Chateaurault, Europe’s largest F-86 and B-29 maintenance facility, withproviding the French with opportunities to build skills and learning by servicing U.S. military jets,
[Samuels, p. 2031 but the French, far from being the “new kids on the block” had a strong
presence in aviation back to its earliest days. The industry, devastated like the rest of the country
after the war, received substantial help from the U.S. in rebuilding its lost productive capacity.
The French government played a strong role in technology development, with many of the major
French aerospace firms state-owned. However, producing for a small domestic market in the
context of a global market increasingly dominated by formidable competitors across the Atlantic,
the French in the 1950’s came to decide that their best competitive strategy would involve
European cooperation. [Thornton, pp. 45-561
Prior French-German cooperation on such military projects as the Breguet 1150 Atlantic
ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) Patrol Aircraft and the Transall C-160 troop transport laid the
ground for the most comprehensive and successf51 European cooperative aerospace venture, the
Airbus. [Thornton, p.551 The unwavering commitment of the French to European collaboration
on the Airbus project in the face of vacillation on the part of Rolls Royce was probably the single
greatest factor in SNECMA’s  current success in the international aero-engine market. Rolls
lobbied hard to supply the RB207 engine for the first Airbus, the A300, subsequently withdrawing
from the program only a few years later, in 1968, under financial strains associated with problems
in developing the RB211 for the Lockheed 1011. The British had made a strategic error in over-
committing to both the RB207 and RB211 projects simultaneously, resulting in both projects
being plagued by performance problems and cost overruns. [Thornton, p.781 The withdrawal of
the only European manufacturer capable of designing, manufacturing, and servicing a large turbo-
fan for the ambitious Airbus program left cooperation with a U.S. manufacturer as the only other
alternative. The Airbus consortium decided on GE’s CF-6 engine with SNECMA assigned a
leading subcontracting role amounting to about 25% of the value of the engine with the German
firm MTU taking a 10% share. [Hayward, p. 1301
This relationship between GE and SNECMA developed from a subcontractor to co-
development partner with the two firms joining as equal partners in the development of the
CFM56. While “not entirely convinced that a 22,000 - 26,000 lb. [thrust] engine was a sound
prospect, [GE] was attracted by the idea of sharing the costs [of developing such an engine] with
14a publicly financed company.” [Hayward, p. 13 I] In fact at the time of the agreement in 1971, GE
had very little to lose by cooperating with SNECMA and very much to gain. Not only could  GE
access inexpensive capital and strengthen its relationship with an important sub-contractor, the
CFM-56 designed around the military F 10 1 engine would embody some of the most advanced
technology available in a commercial power plant, representing a leap forward in engine
performance and design. Moreover, the CFM-56 would enjoy a distinct advantage over U.S.-
built engines among European customers (especially Air-bus customers) who would prioritize high
levels of European content in engine decisions. For its part, SNECMA stood to gain from access
to cutting-edge jet technology and to expanding manufacturing activities. However, a scare came
in 1972 for the principals in this story, when the U.S. government threw cold water on GE’s plans
to transfer the FlOl’s “hot-core” technology abroad.6 [Hayward, p. 1321 An agreement was
subsequently negotiated between the U.S. government, GE and SNECMA limiting both the extent
of technology transfer and SNECMA’s role in systems integration. Within a year the project was
up and running once again and the rest, as they say, is history. The CFM-56 has been a
tremendous success by either technical or commercial measures. As of 1993, 3,8 12 CFM-56’s
were in service world-wide. The CFM-56 dominates the mid-size engine market: it is installed on
71% of Airbus A32O’s, 100% of Airbus A34O’s, 58% of Boeing 737’s and 34% of DC-8’s.
[Aerospace Industries Association, p. 88-891
More recently, though, SNECMA has experienced losses associated with its risk-sharing
partnership with GE in the GE-90 program for Boeing’s 777. Cut-throat price competition for
engines for the 777 led to deep discounts, forcing job cuts. [Sparaco, 1996, p.501 By late 1994,
employment at SNECMA was down to about 11,500. However, in the face of these difficulties,
SNECMA also tried to blunt the impact of cost-cutting, proposing a shortened work week and
initiating efforts to reduce engine development costs by reducing lead times. Also, as a  state-
owned company, SNECMA can rely on capital injections from the French government and other
sources of low-cost, long-term financing to carry on new development projects, such as the  CFM-
XX, a 40,000-43,000 thrust engine for “growth versions” of the Airbus A340. [Sparaco, 1995, p.
6 The “hot core” of an engine comprises the high-pressure turbine and compressor. It is the “heart of
any jet engine, and is the most difficult element in an  engine’s design.” [Hayward, p. 1321
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The success of the GE-SNECMA partnership illustrates the priority the French have
placed on nurturing a globally competitive engine industry. Due to its small size, it is unlikely that
SNECMA could independently undertake the design, development, and manufacture of a major
new engine program, since to do so would require massive investments, not only in tooling and
design and testing capabilities, but also in a worldwide network for marketing and product
support. Still, for now it may be enough that the French have established themselves as critical
links in the supply chain, maintaining a stock of good jobs in Europe when so many other
industries see these good jobs slipping away.
Japan’
The key players in engine manufacture in Japan are the Japanese Heavies: Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries QvlHI), and Kawasaki Heavy
Industries (KHI). Japan’s history in aircraft production is a long one, but was interrupted in the
key post-war years 1945 to 1952. U.S. military forces dismantled the industry, banning all
activities related to aircraft, from manufacturing to repair to research activities. However,
according to Samuels’ account, the key firms never really exited the industry. Ishikawajima-
Harima, for example, was actively engaged in gas turbine research during the years of the ban,
“ostensibly for marine transport,” research activities which positioned IHI to become the leader
among Japanese firms in engine manufacture, a lead which has held to the present day. [Samuels,
p. 198-2001
Still, the ban meant seven lost years in manufacturing at a critical juncture, just as jet
technology was fundamentally changing military and soon, commercial transports. In an effort to
regain lost ground, Japan played an active role in repairing and servicing U.S. fleets engaged in
the Korean, then Vietnam wars hoping to become “Asia’s Chateaurault.” [Samuels, p.  2031
As Japanese skills and capacity grew, so did opportunities for co-production, especially on
’ This section borrows from Samuels thorough historical account of the Japanese aircraft industry,
“Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca and London. 1994.
I6military projects. Throughout the 1950s and 196Os, Japanese companies produced a variety of
fighters, trainers and military transports under license from the U.S. companies that had developed
these products for the U.S. Department of Defense. Generally, firms were first sent “knock-down
kits” to assemble, then as learning progressed, domestic content gradually increased. Japanese
firms benefitted greatly Corn the substantial technology transfers associated with co-production as
firms “received all product designs and specifications and all process specifications.” [Hall and
Johnson, as quoted in Samuels, p.2091 Japanese firms also got assistance with tooling and training
and, in some cases, outright subsidies from the U.S. DOD. Over the course of the past three
decades, this process of indigen&ion progressed impressively. Whereas the J-79 engine for the
F-104 Star-fighter was originally imported from the U.S. in 1960, by the end of the F- 104 program
in 1966, domestic content of the engine had risen to 59.9%. [Samuels, p. 2171 And by 1990, the
Pratt and Whitney FlOO engine, manufactured for Japan’s F-15 fighters had Japanese content of
75% by dollar value, ten years after the first knock-down kits were delivered in 1980. However,
in these programs, Japanese firms were excluded from certain activities, such as design and ’
development, and shielded from sensitive components such as the high pressure turbine and
combustion system. Access to these activities and components would be crucial to Japanese firms
becoming players in the world engine market. Thus, at the same time that the industry was
following a strategy of “autonomy through dependence”, many in Japan argued in favor of
indigenous development to give aircraft and engine manufacturers practice in activities from
which they were precluded in licensed production projects. Indigenous projects, both military and
civil were attempted and in some cases, carried out, but these projects generally did not
encompass indigenous engine development.
By the mid-1980s,  the capacity and skills of Japanese producers had reached a level that
posed a serious competitive threat to U.S. firms in supplying certain aircraft and engine
components. A report by the General Accounting Ofice claimed that Japanese learning as a
result of the F-15 program had, in some cases, served to “displace the original U.S. supplier and
licenser.”  [Samuels, p.23 l] Resistance to transferring technology to Japan came to a head
politically with the “FS-X War” of the late 1980’s. Japan felt ready to “graduate” from co-
producer of U.S. military jets to developing the next generation FS-X (Fighter Support
17Experimental), but under intense political pressure, the Japan Defense Agency decided on a
modified version of General Dynamics’ F- 16 to be powered by the GE F 110 engine. A series of
negotiations ensued regarding the co-development process, circumscribing the extent of
technology transfer from the U.S. to Japan, but also including provisions for “flow-back” of
Japanese technologies that represented improvements to know-how originally transferred by the
U.S. MC, p. 1241 However, these technology transfer and flow-back issues probably are not as
significant for the engine as they are for the rest of the FS-X aircraft. The Fl 10 engine designated
for the FS-X is not “markedly di&erent”  from the engine used on the previous generation F-16
fighter. So, “the development phase is a relatively simple process.” NC, p. 1351 At the same
time, however, the FS-Xprogram is significant in that it represents the first time that Japan
“would receive U.S. assistance in design and development of an advanced fighter”. Co-
development is significant in that it involves the transfer of “not only manufacturing processes or
‘know-how’ but full design processes, or ‘know-why,’ as well.” [Samuels,  p.2411
This movement from supplier/co-producer to development partner has not been limited to
military projects. In commercial projects, Japanese firms which started as suppliers, began to
participate with the large engine makers during the late 70’s as “risk sharing partners” in projects
such as the PW4000  (with MHI’s stake at 10% and KHI’s stake at 1%) and JT8D-200 (MHI had
2.8% stake). In these projects, while the Japanese firms played no development role, they
committed as equity partners in projects, taking responsibility for tooling and plant investment in
exchange for defined work shares on a sole-source basis. U.S. firms pursued risk-sharing
partnerships to spread the burden of up-front production costs as well as to secure relationships
with reliable suppliers. Japanese firms participated in risk-sharing arrangements with the
anticipation that such arrangements were just the next rung in the ladder towards eventual
partnering in design and development.
Indeed, this type of partnering has progressed. Through the International Aero Engines
(ME) consortium, for example, the Japanese firms MHI, KHI and IHI developed and
manufacture the fan and low pressure compressor for the V2500 engine, giving these firms
valuable learning opportunities in areas where they previously had been inexperienced. The
organization of MHI, KHI and IHI in a consortium of their own JAEC, within IAE, facilitateswork share distribution and technology diffision among all three firms. A more recent example of
Japanese-U.S. firm co-development is the GE90 engine for the new Boeing 777. On this project,
IHI is responsible for designing and developing “several stages of turbine disks for the low
pressure turbine, the blades in those disks and the long shaft that goes between the low pressure
turbine and fan”. mational Research Council (NRC), p. 13 I] GE is “pleased” with IHI’s
performance to.date and has benefitted from IHI’s fast prototyping of turbine blades. [NRC, p.491
Japanese progress in aerospace manufacture has attracted much attention in academic and
policy circles, perhaps curiously since the current competitive position of Japanese firms is quite
lacking in certain key areas. “Across the board the Japanese companies are weak in software and
lack sophistication in the analytical tools necessary to do world-class design.” D\JRC, p. 1431
These disadvantages are compounded by “relatively high unit manufacturing costs and overhead.”
NC, p. 1431 However, observers are usually quick to point out Japanese “ambitions” to
overcome these weaknesses, noting that Japanese firms are “...asking more often for access to
analytical tools [e.g. software and systems integration methodology] in their international
alliances.” [NRC, p. 1431 Moreover, Japanese firms, hke firms in other countries, have become
specialized in the manufacture of particular components. For example, MHI produces turbine and
compressor disks and turbine blades while IHI specializes in the production of long shafts,
manufacturing all such shafts for Pratt, Rolls and for GE’s newest engine, the GE90. NC,
p. 1381 Japanese manufacturing practices are praised as “very effective” in ensuring the very close
tolerances required in engine manufacture. NC, p. 1431
Whether the potential competitive “threat” posed by Japanese firms is any more significant
than potential competition from European producers, the loss of market share by U.S. firms to
Japanese producers in a range of other high-tech industries looms large in the discussion. In the
words of the National Research Council’s Committee on Japan, “...the committee believes that
leadership in global competition will increasingly go to firms emphasizing high-quality, low-cost
manufacturing. This is precisely the area that the Japanese have made their top priority.”
@IRC, p.91 The “industrial targeting” strategy that has served Japanese manufacturing so well in
areas ranging from automobiles to electronics has been steadily pursued by MIT1 in the aerospace
19industry over the course of the last two decades. If Japanese aerospace firms are able to replicate
the successes of their counterparts in other “targeted” industries, U.S. suppliers, and perhaps even
U.S. integrators will have reason for concern over their competitive positions.
One telling indication that Japanese manufacturers are indeed committed to maintaining a
presence in the industry for the long-haul is MITI’s sponsorship of the Japanese
Supersonic/Hypersonic Propulsion Technology Program (JSPTP or HYPR). The eventual goal of
the project is “the development of a scale prototype turbo-ramjet, Mach 5 methane-fueled
engine”, the next generation supersonic transport. WC, p. I401 The project is Japan’s first
national R&D effort to include international partners; foreign partners Pratt, GE, Rolls, and
SNECMA together share 25% of funding while the Japanese partners IHI, Kawasaki, and MHI
receive 75%. The Japanese partners “take the lead in technology development and design” while
GE and Pratt serve as “coaches,” reviewing design work and offering critique. That MIT1 is
willing to essentially pay GE and Pratt for this service indicates that Japanese firms, though clearly
still behind U.S. producers in key areas, are not content to remain  so.*
Sustainable prosperity in the U.S. aircraft engine industry
Given the success of countries like Japan and France in building domestic aerospace
capability, what are the implications for employment in the industry in the U.S.? Recent
developments suggest they are not positive. Following an unprecedented peacetime boom
peaking in the late 1980’s, the waning Cold War began to shrink Pentagon excesses by the dawn
of the new decade. Meanwhile, the 1990-9 1 Gulf War and recession slowed airline demand and
air traffic. U.S. airframers currently find themselves facing unprecedented competition from
Airbus, while foreign capacity in engine manufacture continues to expand. In this buyer’s market,
manufacturers are making substantial concessions to obtain orders and squeezing their workforces
in an attempt to obtain cost savings and increase “flexibility.” While invoking the rhetoric of the
“new competition,” U.S. manufacturers have impressed upon their workforces and suppliers the
* GE and Pratt are collaborating on their own on research on high-speed civil transport (HCST),
funded by NASA. According to the NRC, this project “involves a much higher funding level than Japanese
government support of HYPR. The U.S. engine makers are not transferring technology from this work to the
Japanese.” [NRC, p. I4 I]
20importance of quality, on-time production. Womack and Jones, in their new book, Lean E&king,
highlight efforts at Pratt and Whitney to lower costs and improve production along “lean”
principles. They describe Pratt’s success at reducing inventories, driving down lead times, and
lowering costs by reorganizing production into “cells”, collapsing job classifications, and
introducing multi-skilling, job rotation, and other forms of work reorganization. Unfortunately,
Womack and Jones’s study focuses on the activities of top managers, championing their
“steamroller” resolve to turn Pratt around, no matter how many people needed to be fired and
how much work had to be outsourced. (As it turned out, employment at Pratt was slashed Corn
51,000 in 1991 to 29,000 by 1994. Several tinctions such as sheet metal forming, disk
fabrication, and gear and gearbox manufacture were all contracted out.) Unfortunately, very little
attention is paid in Womack and Jones’s study to issues of organizational integration. How much
involvement is there by front-line’ production workers in the reorganization on the shop floor?
What has happened with apprenticeships at Pratt? Are there other training initiatives being
undertaken? Are there new capital expenditures? Of what nature? These questions are not
addressed, though are crucial to assessing not only the likely long-term commitment of Pratt to
U.S.-based production, but indeed the competitive position of the industry leader in this
increasingly competitive industry. Thus, it appears that what lies behind trade publication reports
cheering “innovative work reor&nization”  may in fact be a different story altogether. It is an
open question as to whether U.S. firms have undergone a strategic reorientation toward investing
in organizational learning or whether firms are just calling old-fashioned adaptive strategies by
new names. Although on the surface, it seems that Pratt is making strides towards a “high-
performance workplace” that could potentially have positive effects for its competitive position





that might lead us to believe that attempts at work reorganization among
U.S. manufacturers may just be “industrial window dressing” can be found at GE Aircraft
Engines. Whereas in the past, parallel production was established to minimize the effects of  work-
21stoppage, it recently has played an important role in forcing changes in work organization.
[Interview with Jeff Crosby, President, IUE Local 20 1 at GE Aircraft Engines, Lynn] In 199 1, GE
abandoned its “highly-automated, high-volume factory-of-the-titure concept” in favor of
“kaisen’‘-style management practices. [Kandebo, p.561 As a part of this initiative, GE attempted
to collapse several job classifications and broaden tasks workers would be expected to carry out
at its Evendale plant in 1993. The workers refused GE’s attempts and in response the company
shifted work to its other facilities in Lynn, Wilmington, Madisonville, Strother, Kansas, and
Canada, and announced plans to open a mothballed plant near Durham, North Carolina. “In all,
40’% of all part numbers made at Evendale were shifted to other sites”. [Kandebo, p.561 At the
same time, GE cut 3,900 jobs in Evendale in a single year. [Kandebo (b), p.791 In the context of a
cyclical downturn, these cuts were devastating. Employment at Evendale in 1988 was close to
20,000; by 1994 only 8,000 remained. [Kandebo, p.561
GE subsequently turned to its workforce in Lynn making the same “multi-processing”
demand which would have given management a free hand in assigning multiple operations
simultaneously to any worker in the plant. Workers in Lynn rejected this demand out of hand and
the saga of Evendale was again played out in Lynn. Work was shifted out of Lynn and held out
to the devastated Evendale  plant as the “reward” they would receive if they would now accept
GE’s work reorganization demands. It worked; Evendale employees voted in early 1994 to
accept the company’s demands. It was Lynn’s turn on the “hot seat.“9 The union in Lynn has
continued to resist proposals that would give management any unrestricted rights to reassign
workers, preferring to negotiate changes on a case-by-case basis. This strategy has been working
reasonably well for the union, but problems remain. The multi-skilling agreements contain no
provisions for training and apprenticeship are long gone from GE. In fact, it is the union that has
taken the lead locally in developing training programs that would maintain the region’s skill base
in the face of the aging Lynn workforce. [Interview with Jeff Crosby, President,  IUE, Local 201
at GE Aircraft Engines, Lynn] It is observations like these that suggest that there may be a
9 This whipsawing is made that much easier for GE, by the fact that its aircraft engine  workforce  is
represented by three different unions: the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), the United Auto
Workers (UAW), and the International Association of Machinists (IAM).
22darker side to the shift to the “high-performance workplace.” They also suggest that GE, in spite
of its long history of various “programs” (the “pilot program”, the quality control movement, the
“Work-Out”, and now, “Sigma Six”), has remained reluctant to make the kind of long-term
investments that organizational integration requires.
GE chief Jack Welch, discussing his current strategy to drive down costs and improve
quality, recently.remarked,
“You can’t behave in a rational manner. You’ve got to be out there on the lunatic f?inge.
You have to tell your people that quality is critical to survival, you have to demand
everybody gets trained, you have to cheerlead, you have to have incentive bonuses, you
have to say, ‘We must do this.“’ [Carley, p.Al]
But Welch’s program stops far short of the requirements for real organizational learning. For
example, the training he refers to applies only to “Quality Black Belts,” managers who “spend full
time roaming GE plants and setting up quality-improvement projects.” [Carley, p. AS] Training of
front-line workers apparently is not considered important in ensuring quality at GE. Likewise,
“incentive bonuses” are reserved for management. The threat ofjob loss due to shifts of work is
the only “incentive” held out for production workers. [Interview with Jeff Crosby, President, IUE,
Local 201 at GE Aircraft Engines, Lynn]
Indeed the threat is a credible one: employment at GE has fallen dramatically from about
40,000 in 1988 to only about 22,000 by the end of 1994.  [Kandebo,  p.561 Moreover, GE’s job
cuts have not been restricted to production workers. “The white-collar engineering staff, which
peaked at 10,000 in 1991 was slashed to 4,000.” [Smart and Schiller,  p.781
Supplier Squeeze
Suppliers to the major firms have also felt the squeeze: “Pratt wants its vendor list cut to
200, already down to 465 last year from 596 in 1990.” [Feldman,  p.561 On its face, this could be a
signal of a new era of closer ties between suppliers and primes, one in which long-term production
relationships, rather than short-term cost considerations, determine who will build parts and
components for the big three. Again, though, Looking below the surface, it becomes clear that
cost consideration are still foremost in the supplier-prime game. One GE supplier remarked
“Over the last three to four years, we’ve noticed a significantly worsening relationship [with
23GE],” citing GE demands for a 15% price reduction, “on top of 15%” the prior year. [Smart and
Schiller, p.781 “Since 1992, GE has extracted huge concessions from suppliers, while trimming
its list of vendors by nearly two-thirds, to 500.” [Smart and Schiller, p.781 However, the intense
downsizing of the supplier base during the first half of the decade may be coming home to roost,
now that orders are once again on the upswing. Both GE and Pratt managers acknowledge that
“there is not eno_ugh  capacity in the supply chain at this time.” [Velocci,  p.631 Thus, it appears
that organizational integration along the production chain remains a challenge to U.S. firms as
well.
The Innovation Dynamic
The effects of the seeming lack of organizational integration for the titure of the industry
appear gloomy. In the new “streamlined” environment, research and new product development
cannot be sustained by firms alone, increasing the role for international partners to participate in
development, who are ready, willing and able to participate. In a tacit acknowledgment of the
improved competitive position of Japanese and European partners, U.S. firms increasingly hope to
gain “flow-back” process technologies from collaboration. The 1990’s are also seeing an
emergence of other countries intent on playing in the world aerospace market. With the growth
of the economies of the Newly Industrialized Countries and China, more and more aircraft orders
are coming from the Pacific Rim and forecasts expect that the trend will continue into the 21st
century. According to a GAO report, over the next twenty years, more than 50% of world air
traffic will be to, from or within Asia. [GAO, p.21
Like their European and Japanese counterparts two decades earlier, Asian buyers
negotiate “offsets,” co-production and licensed production arrangements with the intent of
nurturing their own, domestic aerospace industries. These “offset” deals are negotiated as part of
an aircraft purchase agreement and specify that a certain portion of the aircraft will be produced
locally and/or that local suppliers be given some fixed share of the work. According to one report,
offsets have “become the rule, more than the exception” in military markets and are becoming
increasingly common in-the civil sector, despite the fact that they “in principle” violate a number
of trade agreements. [Barber and Scott, p.291 Unions representing aerospace workers in the U.S.
24decry offset deals as U.S. corporations “giving away the store.” “Instead of safeguarding
technologies they (and the U.S. taxpayers) spent billions to develop, the aerospace giants are
pouring these precious skills into Asia.” [IAM Journal, p. 131 However, without a seat at the table
when sales are negotiated, U.S. workers are powerless to prevent their jobs from becoming chips
on the table.
Indeed, the current decade has seen the proliferation of a number of new international
partnerships in engine manufacture. The most significant of these is Pratt and Whitney’s joint
venture with the Chinese Chengdu Engine Company. This, the first aerospace joint venture in the
PRC, was announced in early 1996 and produces engine parts for Pratt and Whitney. For its part,
GE also is involved in cooperative ventures in China [GAO, p. lo] Some believe that an “Asian
Airbus” consortium is just a matt’er of time and South Korea has played a “leading role” in
organizing such an effort that w&Id include “China, Singapore, India and others.” [EPI, p.661
Further west, aerospace firms in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and
Eastern European countries may play a role in the global aerospace industry of the next century.
Although observers note that engine manufacture was a weakness in the former Soviet Union,
[EPI, p.561, that has not prevented Pratt from joining with Perm Motors to “co-produce engines
for long-range airliners.” [Galuszka and Smart, p.401
What effect on the competitive position on the industry in the U.S. these new international
relationships will have remains to be seen. Looking backward, it is clear that in an industry like
aircraft engine manufacture, there are many obstacles to becoming an integrated producer. Firms
like IHI, SNECMA, and MTU have become critical players in the world aero-engine market, but
lack a number of capabilities central to competing with the “big three.” It seems likely that over
the short to medium term, where competitive effects will continue to be felt will be among the
ranks of supplier firms. The past two decades have shown the potential for international
competitors to make inroads into engine parts manufacture, with the results for the stock of  high-
quality jobs discouraging for U.S. workers. Employment is approaching historic lows and wages
appear to have stagnated. [See Appendix 2.1
Over the longer haul, though, it may be anyone’s game. If Japanese and European
producers are willing to commit to organizational investments, the terrain could very well shift
25enough in the industry for a fourth integrator to emerge. Or, there may be consolidation in the
industry along the lines of the recent Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, to make room for
another competitor. Last year’s announcement by GE and Pratt that they would collaborate on
the development of an engine for the new expanded Boeing 747-500X and  600X super-wide
bodies is probably an indication that neither firm wants a repeat of the kind of cutthroat
competition they had to suffer in the scramble to supply engines for the 777. [PR Newswire,
September 2, 19961 That competition wasn’t devastating enough to either firm’s bottom line for
the GP7176 alliance to represent an early indication of something more, although this
“unprecedented alliance” of the two largest engine manufacturers in the world is certainly an
interesting development. It remains to be seen whether international partners will be brought on
board for this project. Who will eventually perform the work involved in building the GP7176
may be indicative of the future direction of the industry. Will Pratt and GE regroup, invest in
their workforces  and make steps toward organizational integration? Or will the new century see
the continued flight of high-quality jobs from U.S. manufacturing?
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Appendix 1 - Product Specifications of Large Commercial Aircraft
Powerplant Maximum Power
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Source: Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 13, I99 7.
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29Appendix 3 - Shares of WorId CiviI Turbojet Market
Percent of Civil Tuhojet  Engine Market
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